



UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/752,620	01/06/2004	Manish Upendran	158588-0008	5967

23911 7590 08/15/2005

CROWELL & MORING LLP
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUP
P.O. BOX 14300
WASHINGTON, DC 20044-4300

EXAMINER

FISCHER, ANDREW J

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
----------	--------------

3627

DATE MAILED: 08/15/2005

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary

Application No.

10/752,620

Applicant(s)

UPENDRAN ET AL.

Examiner

Andrew J. Fischer

Art Unit

3627

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 01 July 2005.
- 2a) ☐ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☒ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-39 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) 14-39 is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-13 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on _____ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
- ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
 - ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
 - ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- 1) ☒ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____.
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____.
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
- 6) ☐ Other: _____.

u

DETAILED ACTION

Acknowledgements

1. Applicants' response filed July 1, 2005 is acknowledged. Accordingly, claims 1-39 remain pending.
2. Applicant's election with traverse of Group I (claims 1-13) in the reply filed July 1, 2005 is acknowledged. The traversal is on the ground(s) that "mere difference in classification, by itself, is an insufficient basis to require the filing of additional applications drawn to the same invention."¹ This is not found persuasive. While the Examiner agrees with Applicants' statement on its face (*i.e.* that "mere difference in classification, by itself, is an insufficient basis to require the filing of additional applications drawn to the same invention"), the statement is not applicable to this case because difference in classification, the claims are also patentably distinct. Applicants are therefore reminded that MPEP §808.02 (A) in combination with related inventions that are patentably distinct will establish a *prima facie* case for restriction. An example will help illustrate the Examiner's point.
3. First, suppose two hypothetical groups of Inventions—Group A (claims 1-9) and Group B (claims 10-20)—each having claims 1 and 10 respectively as their only independent claims. Next, suppose that all the claim elements in Group A can be summarized as E_A . Supposed that Group B contains some of the claim elements from Group A (*i.e.* E_A) and some additional elements not found in Group A, *i.e.*, E_B . Therefore Group B could be summarized as having both $E_A + E_B$ claim elements.

¹ Applicant's Response to Restriction Requirement filed July 1, 2005 ("First Restriction Response, page 2, ¶1).

Art Unit: 3627

4. In a first scenario, if we agree that Group A *is not patentably distinct* from Group B (*i.e.*, claim 1 is not patentably distinct from claim 10), the Examiner agrees that a restriction is improper. See MPEP §§ 810 and 808.02 1st ¶. This makes sense because in this first scenario, suppose an examiner sets forth an erroneous restriction which ultimately results in a divisional application. However, in such a case, an obvious non-statutory double patenting rejection is proper since we agreed (by definition) that claims 1 and 10 are not patentable distinct. However the erroneous restriction would bar the double patenting rejection causing a chaotic situation. Without the restriction and because claims 1 and 10 are not patentably distinct, the obvious non-statutory double patenting rejection is proper. See MPEP §804 II B. 1.
5. In a second scenario, if we agree that Group A *is patentably distinct* from Group B (*i.e.* claim 1 is patentable distinct from claim 10), a restriction is proper. And by definition, there can be no double patenting. However because of the mandatory electronic searches required for allowance in class 705,² the examiner would be *required* to search for patentably distinct features E_B—even if Group A (*i.e.* E_A) was searched and considered allowed. This additional search is *prima facie* evidence to support a restriction. See MPEP §808.02 (C).
6. Should Applicants expressly state on the record that the groups of inventions are not patentably distinct after each and every claim amendment submitted and provide appropriate evidence in support thereof, the Examiner may reconsider the restriction in light of the amended claims and Applicant's evidence. However, based upon the claims as currently filed, because

² See *Notification of Required and Optional Search Criteria for Computer Implemented Business Method Patent Applications in Class 705, and Request for Comments*, Federal Register, Vol. 66, No. 108, 30167, June 5, 2001.

Art Unit: 3627

inventions are patentably distinct, and because of the separate classification noted in the previous office action, the requirement is still deemed proper and is therefore made FINAL.

7. Claims 14-39 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.142(b), as being drawn to a nonelected invention, there being no allowable generic or linking claim. Applicant timely traversed the restriction (election) requirement in the reply filed on July 1, 2005.

8. All references in this Office Action to the capitalized versions of “Applicants” refers specifically the Applicants of record. References to lower case versions of “applicant” or “applicants” refers to any or all patent “applicants.” Unless expressly noted otherwise, references to “Examiner” in this Office Action refers to the Examiner of record while reference to or use of the lower case version of “examiner” or “examiners” refers to examiner(s) generally.

9. This Office Action is written in OACS. Because of this, the Examiner is unable to control formatting, paragraph numbering, font, spelling, line spacing, and/or other word processing issues. The Examiner sincerely apologies for these errors.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §102

10. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. §102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office Action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –

(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for a patent.

(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States. . . .

(e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except that an

Art Unit: 3627

international application filed under the treaty defined in section 351(a) shall have the effects for purposes of this subsection of an application filed in the United States only if the international application designated the United States and was published under Article 21(2) of such treaty in the English language.

11. Claims 1-5, 8, 12, and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by Rautila et. al. (U.S. 6,918,131 B1)(“Rautila”). Rautila discloses a user computer (10-n in Figure 1) coupled to a data network (Internet 30); to display a user interface (on the user’s computer); a broadcast-based client-side device (television 80 in combination with set-top box 84) coupled to the network (Figure 1); the client-side device is able to receive user preferences (as communicated to the system) which includes “user account information” [C3, L6-16] ; the client-side device includes a display (CRT within TV 80) and a user input device (set top box 84); a broadcasts source 70 which is a television programming source; a secure logon operation (inherent in the Internet connection); a third party retailer (inherent in lottery purchase, C5, L30); and a payment method (using the viewer’s “financial account number”).

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §103

12. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. §103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office Action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

13. Claims 1-5, 8, 12, and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Rautila in view of White’s How Computers Work 6th Ed. (“White”).³ It is the Examiner’s

³ See MPEP §2112 expressly authorizing alternative §102/§103 rejections when the question of inherency is present in the anticipation rejection.

Art Unit: 3627

principle position that the claims are anticipated because a computer inherently has a user interface.

However if not inherent, White teaches that computers have a user interface which is a keyboard. Therefore it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify Rautila as taught by White to directly disclose a keyboard. Such a modification would have simply disclosed that which is inherent in a computer.

14. Claims 6, 7, and 9-11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Rautila in view of Swix et. al. (U.S. 6,718,551 B1)(“Swix”). Rautila discloses as discussed above but does not directly disclose a user profile which is based on tracking user activities. Swix teaches a user profile which is based upon content viewed by tracking and storing viewer selections. Swix also discloses that a viewer can purchase video on demand and that the information is (which can be alphanumeric or graphical information) into the video stream using an overlay on the broadcast programming.

Therefore it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify Rautila as taught by Swix to supplement Rautila’s customer data with data describing the viewer’s viewing habits. Such a modification would have improved the profiling of the target consumer by providing advertisements to each viewer in which the viewer is predisposed to purchase.

Art Unit: 3627

15. After careful review of the specification, the Examiner is unaware of any desire—either expressly or implicitly—by Applicants to be their own lexicographer and to define a claim term to have a meaning other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning. Therefore, the Examiner starts with the heavy presumption that all claim limitations are given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. See *Bell Atlantic Network Services Inc. v. Covad Communications Group Inc.*, 262 F.3d 1258, 1268, 59 USPQ2d 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.”); *CCS Fitness Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.*, 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 USPQ2d 1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (There is a “heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning.”). See also MPEP §2111.01 and *In re Zletz*, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989).⁴

In accordance with the ordinary and accustomed meaning presumption, during examination the claims are interpreted with their “broadest reasonable interpretation” *In re Morris*, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also MPEP §2111.

However, if Applicants disagree with the Examiner and have either (a) already used lexicography or (b) wish to use lexicography and therefore (under either (a) or (b)) desire a claim limitation to have a meaning other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning, the Examiner respectfully requests Applicants in their next response to expressly indicate⁵ the claim limitation

⁴ It is the Examiner’s position that “plain meaning” and “ordinary and accustomed meaning” are synonymous. See e.g. *Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.*, 274 F.3d 1336, 1342, 60 USPQ2d 1851, 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A]ll terms in a patent claim are to be given their plain, ordinary and accustomed meaning . . .”).

⁵ “Absent an *express intent* to impart a novel meaning, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. [Emphasis added.]” *Wenger Manufacturing Inc. v. Coating*

Art Unit: 3627

at issue and to show where in the specification or prosecution history the limitation is defined.

Such definitions must be clearly stated in the specification or file history. *Bell Atlantic*, 262 F.3d at 1268, 59 USPQ2d at 1870, (“[I]n redefining the meaning of particular claim terms away from the ordinary meaning, the intrinsic evidence must ‘clearly set forth’ or ‘clearly redefine’ a claim term so as to put one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee intended to so redefine the claim term”).⁶ The Examiner cautions that no new matter is allowed.

Applicants are reminded that failure by Applicants in their next response to properly traverse this issue in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) or to be non-responsive to this issue entirely will be considered a desire by Applicants to forgo lexicography in this application and to continue having the claims interpreted with their broadest reasonable interpretation.⁷

Additionally, it is the Examiner’s position that the above requirements are reasonable.⁸ Unless

Mach. Sys., Inc., 239 F.3d 1225, 1232, 57 USPQ2d 1679, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). “In the absence of an *express intent* to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor’s claim terms take on their ordinary meaning. We indulge a heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. [Emphasis added.]” *Teleflex Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp.*, 299 F.3d 1313, 1325, 63 USPQ2d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and quotations omitted).

⁶ See also *Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.*, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996), (“[A] patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, *as long as* the special definition of the term is *clearly stated* in the patent specification or file history. [Emphasis added.]”); *Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd.*, 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Such special meaning, however, must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the field of the invention.”). See also MPEP §2111.01, subsection titled “Applicant May Be Own Lexicographer” and MPEP §2173.05(a) titled “New Terminology.”

⁷ See 37 C.F.R. §1.104(c)(3) which states in part: “the examiner may rely upon admissions by applicant . . . as to *any matter* affecting patentability [Emphasis added.]”

⁸ The Examiner’s requirements on this matter are reasonable on at least two separate and independent grounds. First, the Examiner’s requirements are simply an express request for

Art Unit: 3627

expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, the preceding discussion on claim interpretation principles applies to all examined claims currently pending.

16. To the extent that the Examiner's interpretations are in dispute with Applicants' interpretations, the Examiner hereby adopts the following definitions—under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard—in all his claim interpretations.⁹ Moreover, while the following list is provided in accordance with *In re Morris*, the definitions are a guide to claim terminology since claim terms must be interpreted in context of the surrounding claim language.¹⁰ Finally, the following list is not intended to be exhaustive in any way:

Computer: “Any machine that does three things: accepts structured input, processes it according to prescribed rules, and produces the results as output.” Computer Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Microsoft Press, Redmond, WA, 1997.¹¹ **Client:** “3. On a local area network or

clarification of how Applicants intend their claims to be interpreted so that lexicography (or even an *attempt* at lexicography) by Applicants is not inadvertently overlooked by the Examiner. Second, the requirements are reasonable in view of the USPTO's goals of compact prosecution, productivity with particular emphasis on reductions in both pendency and cycle time, and other goals as outlined in the USPTO's The 21st Century Strategic Plan, February 3, 2003 available at www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/index.htm (last accessed August 8, 2005).

⁹ While most definition(s) are cited because these terms are found in the claims, the Examiner may have provided additional definition(s) to help interpret words, phrases, or concepts found in the definitions themselves or in the prior art.

¹⁰ See e.g. *Brookhill-Wilk 1 LLC v. Intuitive Surgical Inc.*, 334 F.3d 1294, 1300, 67 USPQ2d 1132, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (abstract dictionary definitions are not alone determinative; “resort must always be made to the surrounding text of the claims in question”).

¹¹ Based upon Applicants' disclosure, the art of record, and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in this art as determined by the factors discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that the *Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary* is an appropriate technical dictionary known to be used by one of ordinary skill in this art. See e.g. *Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp.*, 318 F.3d 1363, 1373, 65 USPQ2d 1865, 1872 (Fed. Cir. 2003) where the Federal Circuit used the *Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary* (3d ed.) as “a technical dictionary” to define the term “flag.” See also *In re Barr*, 444 F.2d 588, 170 USPQ 330 (CCPA 1971)(noting that its

Art Unit: 3627

Internet, a computer that accesses shared network resources provided by another computer (called a server).” *Id.* *Server*: “2. On the Internet or other network, a computer or program that responds to commands from a client.” *Id.*

17. With respect to the pending claims 1-13, it is the Examiner’s factual determination that claim 1 begins “A system comprising” Moreover, dependent claims 2-13 also begin “A system” In light of Applicants’ choice to claim a system, the Examiner respectfully reminds Applicants that: “A system is an apparatus.” *Ex parte Fressola* 27 USPQ2d 1608, 1611 (B.P.A.I. 1993)(citations omitted). Additionally, “[c]laims in apparatus form conventionally fall into the 35 U.S.C. §101 statutory category of a ‘machine.’” *Ex parte Donner*, 53 USPQ2d 1699, 1701 (B.P.A.I. 1999)(unpublished), (Paper No. 34, page 5, issued as U.S. Patent 5,999,907). Therefore, it is the Examiner’s position that Applicants’ system claims are “product,” “apparatus,” or more specifically, “machine” claims.¹²

18. In light of Applicants’ choice to peruse product claims, Applicants are also reminded that functional recitations using the word “for,” “to,” “usable,” or other functional terms (*e.g.* see claim 1 which recites “usable to enter a plurality of purchase preferences”) have been considered but are given less patentable weight¹³ because they fail to add any structural limitations. Such limitations are thereby regarded as intended use language. To be especially clear, the Examiner

appropriate to use technical dictionaries in order to ascertain the meaning of a term of art) and MPEP §2173.05(a) titled ‘New Terminology.’

¹² Products may be either machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter. MPEP §2106 IV B. 2 (a).

¹³ See *e.g. In re Gulack*, 703 F.2d 1381, 217 USPQ 401, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1983)(stating that although all limitations must be considered, not all limitations are entitled to patentable weight.).

Art Unit: 3627

has considered all claim limitations. However, a recitation of the intended use in a product claim must result in a structural difference between the claimed product and the prior art in order to patentably distinguish the claimed product from the prior art. If the prior art structure is capable of performing the intended use, then it reads on the claimed limitation. *In re Casey*, 370 F.2d 576, 152 USPQ 235 (CCPA 1967) (“The manner or method in which such machine is to be utilized is not germane to the issue of patentability of the machine itself.”); *In re Otto*, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963). See also MPEP §§ 2114 and 2115. Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, the claim interpretation principles in this paragraph apply to all examined claims currently pending.

19. Additionally, the Examiner notes that “the PTO and the CCPA acknowledged product-by-process claims as an exception to the general rule requiring claims to define products in terms of structural characteristics.” *Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.*, 970 F.2d 834, 845, 23 USPQ2d 1481, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (hereinafter “*Atlantic Thermoplastics v. Faytex I*”). Furthermore, the Federal Circuit “acknowledges that it has in effect recognized . . . product-by-process claims as exceptional.” *Atlantic Thermoplastics v. Faytex I*, 970 F.2d at 847, 23 USPQ2d at 1491.

Because of this exceptional status, the Examiner has carefully reviewed the claims and it is the Examiner’s position that claims 1-13 *do not* contain any product-by-process limitations whether in a conventional format or otherwise. If Applicants disagree with the Examiner, the Examiner respectfully requests Applicants in their next response to expressly point out any product-by-process claim(s) and their limitations so that they may be afforded their exceptional status and treated accordingly. Applicants are reminded that “even though product-by-process

Art Unit: 3627

claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself.” *In re Thorpe*, 777 F.2d 695, 697, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).¹⁴ Failure by Applicants in their next response to also address this issue in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) or to be non-responsive to this issue entirely will be considered intent by Applicants *not* to recite any product-by-process limitations. Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, the preceding discussion on product-by-process principles applies to all examined claims currently pending.

Conclusion

20. References considered pertinent to Applicants’ disclosure are listed on form PTO-892.

All references listed on form PTO-892 are cited in their entirety.

21. The following two (2) citations to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) apply to this Office Action: MPEP citations to Chapters 100, 200, 500, 600, 700, 1000, 1100, 1300, 1400, 1500, 1700, 1800, 2000, 2100, 2200, 2500, 2600, and 2700 are from the MPEP 8th Edition, Rev. 2, May 2004. All remaining MPEP citations are from MPEP 8th Edition, August 2001.

22. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR

¹⁴ See also MPEP §2113.

Art Unit: 3627

system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

23. In accordance with *In re Lee*, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344-45, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1434-35 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the Examiner finds that the references How Computers Work Millennium Ed. and 6th Ed. by Ron White; How Networks Work Millennium Ed. and 6th Ed. by Frank J. Derfler et. al.; and How the Internet Works, Millennium Ed. and 6th Ed. by Preston Gralla are additional evidence of what is basic knowledge or common sense to one of ordinary skill in this art. Each reference is cited in its entirety. Moreover, because these three references are directed towards beginners (see e.g. “User Level Beginning . . .”), because of the references’ basic content (which is self-evident upon review of the references), and after further review of the entire application and all the art now of record in conjunction with the factors as discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that these three references are primarily directed towards those of low skill in this art. Because these three references are directed towards those of low skill in this art, the Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in this art must—at the very least—be aware of and understand the knowledge and information contained within these three references.

24. Also in accordance with *In re Lee*, 277 F.3d at, 1344-45, 61 USPQ2d at 1434-35, the Examiner finds that Nathan J. Muller’s Desktop Encyclopedia of the Internet, (“Desktop Encyclopedia”) is additional evidence of what is basic knowledge or common sense to one of ordinary skill in this art. Muller’s Desktop Encyclopedia is a practical reference that clearly explains Internet services, applications, protocols, access methods, development tools, administration and management, standards, and regulations. Because of the reference’s basic

Art Unit: 3627

content (which is self-evident upon examination of the reference) and after further review of the entire record including the prior art now of record in conjunction with the factors as discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that the Desktop Encyclopedia is primarily directed towards those of low skill in this art. Because the reference is directed towards those of low skill in this art, the Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in this art must—at the very least—be aware of and understand the knowledge and information contained within the Desktop Encyclopedia.

25. In accordance with the USPTO's goals of customer service, compact prosecution, and reduction of cycle time, the Examiner has made every effort to clarify his position regarding claim interpretation and any rejections or objections in this application. Furthermore, the Examiner has provided Applicants with notice—for due process purposes—of his position regarding his factual determinations and legal conclusions. If Applicants disagree with any factual determination or legal conclusion made by the Examiner in this Office Action whether expressly stated or implied,¹⁵ the Examiner respectfully reminds Applicants to properly traverse the Examiner's position(s) in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) in their next response. By addressing these issues now, matters where the Examiner and Applicants agree can be eliminated allowing the Examiner and Applicants to focus on areas of disagreement (if any) with the goal towards allowance in the shortest possible time. If Applicants have any questions regarding the Examiner's positions or have other questions regarding this communication or even previous communications, Applicants are strongly encouraged to contact Examiner Andrew J. Fischer whose telephone number is (571) 272-6779 . If attempts to reach the Examiner by telephone are

Art Unit: 3627

unsuccessful, the Examiner's immediate supervisor, Alexander Kalinowski, can be reached at (571) 272-6771. To respond to this Office Action by facsimile, fax to (571) 873-8300.

AJ Fischer 8/8/05

Andrew J. Fischer
Patent Examiner
Art Unit 3627

AJF
August 8, 2005

¹⁵ *E.g.*, if the Examiner rejected a claim under §103 with two references, although not directly stated, it is the Examiner's implied position that the references are analogous art.